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INTRODUCTION

On January 15, Joseph Smith, an employee of Acme Manufacturing Com679
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pany, injured his lower back while attempting to lift a crate onto a delivery

truck. Following thorough examinations, three physicians separately concluded that he would be unable to work for an indefinite period of time, thus
entitling him to workers' compensation benefits. Over several months,
Smith regularly received his weekly payments from ABC Insurance, Acme's
compensation carrier. A fourth physician, asked by the carrier to evaluate

Smith, believed he was able to return to work. Without warning to Smith,
ABC ordered the discontinuance of the payments based on these findings.
The cessation of payments left Smith economically strained and emotionally
distraught. Unable to work and without other funds, he wondered if he
would be able to adequately support a wife and three children, as well as
keep up the mortgage payments on his six-year-old home. After a lengthy
delay and under considerable stress, Smith settled his case with ABC for an

amount far below what he believed he was entitled to rather than face the
possibility of economic ruin.'
The above scenario, although not uncommon,' is the exception and not
the rule, in that most workers' compensation claims are handled quickly and
in good faith by the insurance carrier. Nevertheless, under current Texas
law, if a carrier unreasonably or intentionally refuses or delays paying benefits which results in either financial or emotional distress, a Texas workers'
compensation claimant is without the recourse of either an adequate statutory remedy 3 or a common-law bad faith action.4 Although the claimant
1. The above mentioned scenario is purely hypothetical and no reference is intended toward any parties existing at this time or at any time in the past.
2. See, e.g., Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 306 (I11.App. Ct. 1981)
(action for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from insurer deliberately stalling compensation claim causing statute of limitations to run); Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635
S.W.2d 596, 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982) (action for breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing owed under insurance contract and for intentional infliction of
emotional distress resulting from bad faith settlement practices), rev'd on other grounds, 652
S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983); Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Wis.
1979) (damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress occasioned from insurance adjustor's termination of payments resulting in claimant's eviction from home). For cases from
other jurisdictions that have been brought by workers' compensation claimants for either intentional infliction of emotional distress or for intentional harassment resulting from delay or
termination of benefits (i.e., bad faith actions), see, e.g., Escobedo v. American Employers Ins.
Co., 547 F.2d 544, 544 (10th Cir. 1977); Wilkens v. West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 397 So. 2d 115,
117 (Ala. 1981); Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 658, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979). For a list and analysis of more cases in this area, see 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 68.34(c), at n.49.19-.20 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
3. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18a(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The
penalty provision, "not to exceed 15 percent of the weekly indemnity compensation then past
due," is intended to remedy the claimant if the carrier or employer fails to pay, or exercises
unreasonable delay in paying, the claimant's benefits. See id. § 18a(b). These penalty provisions are usually applicable to misconduct of an insurer which is not necessarily intentional in
nature, such as delay, mismanagement, or deficient administrative procedures. See Massey v.
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has some remedies under the Texas statutes, 5 they are most likely inadequate
when the claimant has suffered financial and personal hardships as a result
of the termination of his benefits. 6 It is, therefore, imperative that a remedy
be judicially molded or legislatively enacted to adequately compensate a
7
claimant when a carrier unjustifiably denies an employee's claim.
This comment will focus generally on the development of the tort of bad
faith in relation to insurance law and workers' compensation cases. It will
also explore the viability of extending this bad faith cause of action to workers' compensation claimants in Texas.
Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 604 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982) (James, J.,
dissenting) (discussing inadequacy of penalty provisions of art. 8306, § 18), rev'd on other
grounds, 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983).
4. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983). In Massey, the
claimant alleged that the carrier breached the "duty of good faith and fair dealing owed under
a contract of insurance and sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress."
See id. at 933. Summary judgment was granted by the trial court against the claimant and was
affirmed by the court of appeals under the premise that the workers' compensation statute
provides an employee's exclusive remedy. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596,
598 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.
1983). The supreme court, however, reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded
the case to resolve a technical point, leaving the issue in Massey unresolved. See Massey v.
Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983); see also Brousseau, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 345, 357 (1984) (discussion of exclusivity of
remedy provision in relation to Massey decision).
5. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1985); see also Grove
Mfg. Co. v. Cardinal Constr. Co., 534 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (employee waives cause of action for intentional tort if he proceeds
under workers' compensation act). See generally 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 65.00-67.50 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (comprehensive review of exclusiveness of
workers' compensation remedy).
6. See Comment, Bad Faith Refusal ofInsurance Companies to Pay First Party BenefitsTime for the Illinois Supreme Court to Recognize the Tort and Resulting Punitive Damages,
1984 S. ILL. L.J. 121, 140-41 (discussing policy considerations behind acceptance of bad faith
tort).
7. See Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 262 (Mont. 1980). Finding that
the statutory remedies were inadequate to redress a compensation claimant for harm suffered
as a result of the insurer's bad faith, Justice Daly, of the Montana Supreme Court, stated:
The compensation Act should not be a "shield" which will insulate those who would
engage in intentional wrongdoing in the settlement and investigation of workers' claims.
No one should be allowed intentionally or tortiously to cut-off a claimant unilaterally for
whatever purpose they choose and then hide behind workers' compensation exclusively in
assurance that the only retribution will come in the form of a compensation penalty paid
for by society.
See id. at 262.
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EVOLUTION OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH

Its CaliforniaRoots

The tort of "bad faith"' in the performance and settlement of an insurance
contract was pioneered by the California courts.9 Initially, these courts allowed a third party claimant to recover in excess of the policy limits for an
insurer's bad faith refusal to settle.1 ° The early decisions were not based
wholly on tort principles, but instead were founded on the insurer's violation
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance
contract. 1
The bad faith rationale applied in third party situations was later extended
to a first party claim.1" This decision, however, was based on completely

8. See J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1612, at 368
(1981). Bad faith conduct of an insurer in settling a claim has been construed as being any
unreasonable refusal to pay when the insurer lacks probable cause for withholding the payments. See id, at 368.
9. See id. § 8877, at 283-91 (California pioneered tort of bad faith and its doctrines have
swept field of jurisprudence).
10. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958); Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); see also Harman, An
Insurer'sLiability for the Tort of Bad Faith, 42 MONT. L. REV. 67, 70-72 (1981) (analysis of
early California decisions in development of tort of bad faith); Comment, Tort Liabilityfor an
Insurer'sBad Faith Refusal to Settle: A Developing Trend Appropriatefor Adoption in Missouri,
45 Mo. L. REV. 103, 106-10 (1980) (comprehensively traces development of "third-party excess judgment cases" in development of bad faith tort actions); Note, Tort of Bad Faith
Adopted to Address Insurer's UnreasonableConduct in Settling Valid Claims-Bibeaultv. Hanover Ins. Co., 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 651, 654 (1981) (discussion of California rulings giving
rise to tort of bad faith).
11. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967)
(first case to recognize action based in both tort and contract for insurer's breach of implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 20002 (Cal. 1958) (insurer's refusal to defend insured and accept reasonable settlement offer constituted breach of implied duty to act in good faith); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 319 P.2d 69,
75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (insurer's bad faith in settlement process arose from contractual duties, rather than negligence). Additionally, the Comunale court found the insurer's duty to act
in good faith stems from its duty to consider the interests of its insured as it would its own. See
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958).
12. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (Ct. App. 1970) (first
party claimant recovers as result of company's bad faith); see also Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973). The Gruenberg court discussed the
distinction between first and third party actions. See id. at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485. Third
party bad faith cases usually involve the insurer's "duty to accept reasonable settlements"
when handling a claim against its insured brought by a third party under a liability policy.
Alternatively, first party bad faith cases generally revolve around the insurer's bad faith refusal
to pay valid claims of its own insured under an insurance contract. See id. at 1037, 108 Cal.
Rptr. at 485. Stated differently, first party insurance pays the policyholder for her own losses,
whereas, third party insurance shields the insured from liability claims brought by others. See
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independent grounds from that of a breach of contract action. 3 The court
allowed an insured to recover against a disability insurer under the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress for the insurer's malicious withholding of benefits.' 4 However, the apparent difficulty in establishing evidentiary proof that an insurer "intentionally" inflicted emotional distress on
the insured' 5 led to the landmark decision of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Co. 16 The California Supreme Court, in Gruenberg, relaxed the strict evidentiary standards previously required 17 and for the first time recognized a
separate first party tort claim when an insurer
"unreasonably and in bad
18
claim.
valid
insured's
an
pay
to
refused
faith"
B.

The GruenbergDoctrine of Bad Faith

The Gruenbergcase found that implicit in every insurance contract is an
insurer's duty to act reasonably and in good faith when processing a claim of
its own insured."' This responsibility was found to apply not only to the

Comment, Tort of Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First Party Claims, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
579, 579 & n.1 (1980).
13. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (Ct. App. 1970).
14. See id. at 93. In Fletcher, the insurer cut off the plaintiff's disability payments due
him under a contract of insurance, notwithstanding innumerable medical reports confirming
the plaintiff's disability. See id. at 84. Due to the intentional termination of his benefits, the
plaintiff almost lost his home and other property. See id. at 87. In addition, his family was
lacking for food, and he was eventually forced to "gather" money from neighbors to have his
electricity restored. See id. at 87. Considering the egregious conduct of the insurer in Fletcher,
the court had little difficulty extending a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress to first party claimants. See id. at 93-94; see also Allen, InsuranceBad Faith Law: The
Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833, 837 (1982) (noting facts of Fletcher were
conducive to extension of third party law to first party situation).
15. See Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff must
prove four elements of emotional distress as well as clearly outrageous conduct); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (plaintiff's burden of proof to show defendant's
conduct was intentional, outrageous, and proximate cause of emotional distress); W. PROSSER
& W.P. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54 (5th ed. 1984) (noting one
main drawback of grounding action in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
"difficulty of proof").
16. 510 P.2d 1032, 1037-38, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485-86 (1973) (relying on Comunale,
Crisci, and Fletcher in recognition of tort of bad faith).
17. See id. at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486; see also Parks & Heil, The Tort of "Bad
Faith"--The Impact of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 24 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q.,
Spring 1974, at 3, 14 (Gruenberg may establish standard of proof of something less than intent
to recover for tort of bad faith); Schuessler, First PartyBad Faith:Should It Be Extended To
Workers' Compensation Cases?, 34 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q., Winter 1984, at 199, 201 (noting
that Gruenberg decision relaxes standard of proof from intentional to reasonableness
standard).
18. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486
(1973).
19. See id. at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485. The plaintiff owned a cocktail lounge and
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policy requirements to settle, defend, and pay, but also to the insurer's duty

to carry out those contractual obligations in good faith.2 ° Accordingly, a
violation of this duty was deemed a tort when an insurer "maliciously and
without probable cause" or "unreasonably and in bad faith" withheld payments in1 an attempt to injure or deprive an insured of his benefits under the
policy.

2

The Gruenbergcase is particularly significant because the court found that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover for emotional distress damages even in
the absence of "extreme" or "outrageous" conduct on the part of the insurer.12 The court's reasoning, therefore, gives credence to the proposition
that the evidentiary basis for the tort of bad23faith is less stringent than that of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Nevertheless, after Gruenberg,

restaurant which was destroyed by fire. The structure was insured by three insurance companies which subsequently hired a private adjustor to investigate the claim. While investigating
the claim, the adjustor mentioned to an arson investigator that the plaintiff carried excess
insurance coverage on the building. Three days later the plaintiff was charged with arson and
defrauding an insurer in connection with the fire. See id. at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482. Both
charges, however, were later dismissed due to lack of probable cause. See id. at 1035, 108 Cal.
Rptr. at 483. In processing the claim, the insurer's counsel demanded that the plaintiff submit
to an examination concerning the fire and to produce certain documents as required under the
policy. See id. at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482. Meanwhile, plaintiff's counsel advised him not
to make statements concerning the fire while criminal charges were still pending and asked for
a waiver of the examination until the criminal charges were concluded. See id. at 1034, 108
Cal. Rptr. at 482. The counsel for the insurer proceeded to deny liability due to the plaintiff's
failure to submit to the examination. After the criminal charges were dropped, the plaintiff
notified the insurer he was prepared to submit himself for examination, and his offer was rejected. See id. at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483. The plaintiff alleged in his petition a cause of
action sounding in tort, and the supreme court held that the claim stated sufficient facts to
support a bad faith cause of action in tort. See id. at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
20. See id. at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
21. See id. at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486. See generally Note, An Insurer's Bad Faith
Refusal to Pay a Valid First Party Claim: A Tort Whose Time Has Come in Iowa, 32 DRAKE
L. REV. 987, 988-91 (1983) (comprehensive discussion and analysis of Gruenberg decision in
relation to development of tort of bad faith). In the wake of the Gruenberg decision, two
commentators summarized the state of the law in California as to what damages may be recovered by an insured where an insurer wrongfully breaches his duty of good faith and fair
dealing:
1. all sums due, directly or indirectly, under the contract, which includes not only the
sums promised but conceivably the excess of a judgment, such as in a liability suit by a
third person (and in fire insurance, conceivably extra damages caused by an insurer's
delay or refusal to pay a loss); 2. compensatory damages, including those resulting from
mental and emotional causes following the insurer's improper conduct; 3. punitive or exemplary damages.
J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8877, at 383 (1981).
22. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489-90
(1973).
23. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978). Following
the lead of Gruenberg, the Wisconsin Supreme Court established the test to be applied for an
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in order to recover under the bad faith theory, the insured must at least show
the insurer's absence of a "reasonable basis" in denying benefits.24
III.

EXPANSION OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH

To

WORKERS'

COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS

A.

Policy Considerations

The exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation acts are
designed to balance the gains and sacrifices of employers and employees. 5
The employer assumes liability for "accidental" injuries to employees regardless of fault, but is relieved of the possibility of large damage verdicts
which may jeopardize the future of the employer's business.26 Under the
exclusivity clauses, an employee is not barred from bringing an action for
intentional torts against his employer, but if the employee elects to pursue a
claim under the compensation act, he waives his cause of action for the intentional tort.2 7 The "election of remedies" theory alleviates the problem of
insured to recover under the tort of bad faith: "the absence of a reasonable basis for denying
benefits of the policy and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a
reasonable basis for denying the claim." See id. at 376 (emphasis added). See generally
Schuessler, FirstParty Bad Faith: Should It Be Extended to Workers' Compensation Cases?, 34
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q., Winter 1984, at 199, 201 (reasonableness standard of Gruenberg less
stringent than intentional infliction of emotional distress theory).
24. See Parks & Heil, The Tort of "Bad Faith"--TheImpact of Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Company, 24 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q., Spring 1974, at 3, 11-12 (asserting proposition that
tort of bad faith judged by "reasonable basis" standard in light of Gruenbergdecision). The
impact of the Gruenberg decision is evidenced by the fact that at least 22 other jurisdictions
have judicially recognized a bad faith tort action for an insurer's bad faith settlement practices.
See, e.g., Grand Sheet Metal Prods. v. Protection Mut. Ins., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn. 1977);
Christian v. American Home Assurance, 577 P.2d 899, 902 (Okla. 1978); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Wis. 1978). But see, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 152-53 (Kan. 1980) (bad faith tort action statutorily precluded); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978) (statutory
remedy precludes bad faith tort action); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d
1015, 1023 (Or. 1978) (statute provides exclusive remedy).
25. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 65.00, at 12-1 (1982) (discussion on nature and scope of exclusive remedy provision and corresponding policy
considerations).
26. See id.at 12-1; see also Gunter v. Mersereau, 491 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 1971)
(motivating philosophy behind workmen's compensation act is loss arising from accidents in
industry should be distributed between employer and consumer as cost of production); Woolsey v. Panhandle Ref. Co., 131 Tex. 449, 453, 116 S.W.2d 675, 676 (1938) (workers' compensation objective is to do away with issues of negligence, unavoidable accident, and contributory
negligence, and to fix amount recoverable free from uncertainty).
27. See Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. 1980) (intentional tort
action waived by proceeding under act from injuries derived in course of employment); see also
H. L. Hutton & Co. v. District Court, 398 P.2d 530, 534 (Okla. 1965) (election of remedy
waives other claim).
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an employee's double recovery for his injuries. Both employers and insurers,
however, have used this theory to escape liability for tortious wrongs committed not in the course of employment, but in the processing and settlement
of an employee's claim. 28 As a result, by allowing an insurer to escape liability for its tortious wrongs through the protection offered by the exclusivity
provisions, one of the basic principles of justice, "that no one should profit
by his own wrong," is circumvented.2 9
In light of the preexisting protection the exclusivity clause affords a compensation carrier, the adoption of a bad faith tort action would tend to
equalize the bargaining power between the worker and insurer by prompting
the insurer to act reasonably and in good faith in processing the claim."0
Recognition of a bad faith tort remedy would also compensate a claimant for
any detriment suffered as a result of an insurer's bad faith settlement practices"' and would alleviate the inadequacy of statutory remedies.3 2 While
the statutory remedies provide a good method by which to resolve common

28. See, e.g., Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825
(1972) (wrongful and tortious conduct of insurer beyond protection aspect of exclusivity provision originally intended by act); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 261-62
(Mont. 1980) (insurers frequently insulate themselves from liability for wrongful conduct by
asserting protection of workers' compensation exclusivity provision); Coleman v. American
Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Wis. 1979) (insurer should not be limited to 10%
penalty provision when intentional wrong does not fall within act).
29. See Kaufman, The Scientific Method in Legal Thought: Legal Realism and the Fourteen Principles of Justice, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 77, 89-90 (1980) (rejecting idea that wrong is
what legislature says it is).
30. See Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Wis. 1981)
(bad faith action good policy since promotes assurance worker's "exclusive remedy will not be
denied through the intentional wrongdoings of the insurer"); accord Eckenrode v. Life of Am.
Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972) (insureds forced to take insurance contracts "as is,"
leaving little or no alternative remedy); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d
899, 902 (Okla. 1977) (insured has essentially no bargaining power in insurance contract; relegated to terms of contract as basis of decision to extend insured's bad faith tort action). But see
Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 262-63 (Mont. 1980) (Harrison, J., specially
concurring) (recognition of independent action may place insurers at disadvantage in settling
claims). See generally Note, An Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay a Valid First Party Claim:
A Tort Whose Time Has Come in Iowa, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 987, 990 (1983) (discussion on
policy considerations of applying tort of bad faith to insurance contracts).
31. See, e.g., Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974) (compensation law only exclusive where it provides adequate remedy); Gibson v. National Ben
Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 223 (Me. 1978) (penalty provision of Workmen's Compensation Act not sufficient to redress claimant since fines assessed to insurer paid to state rather
than claimant); Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Wis. 1979)
(10% remedy provision does not adequately compensate worker for detriment occasioned by
intentional tort).
32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2362 (Supp. 1982) (no other penalty for delays in
compensation payments besides amount past due from compensation carrier); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 287.120(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (entitles claimant to 15% increased recovery on past
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cases of payment delay or refusal, these provisions do not contemplate the
harm which may arise from an insurer's intentional bad faith conduct.3 3
Consequently, jurisdictions that have granted a claimant an independent tort
action have done so where the circumstances clearly dictate and not merely
for minor or insignificant violations.
Other Jurisdictions

B.

1. Case Law
a.

Bad Faith Tort Action Extended to Compensation Claimants-The
Coleman Case

The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co., was the first to uphold a bad faith tort action against a compensation carrier for injuries arising out of the settlement and processing of a
workers' compensation claim.34 The plaintiff in Coleman was a workers'
compensation claimant who had received payments for injuries sustained in
the course of employment. 35 Subsequently, when these payments were cut
off, he brought a bad faith action against the insurer, not for his discontinued
payments, but for a separate injury of emotional distress attributed to the
bad faith conduct of the defendant in rejecting his claim.36 The plaintiff
alleged that his payments had been arbitrarily stopped on three separate occasions, notwithstanding the insurer's possession of uncontradicted medical
reports demonstrating the plaintiff's entitlement to continuing payments.37
It was also alleged the defendant's bad faith conduct was intentionally calculated to harm the plaintiff in an attempt to save the company money. 38 Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's termination of payments
due benefits); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18a(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (recovery not to exceed 15% of past due benefits).
33. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Wis. 1979) (pen-

alty of 10% does not contemplate harm resulting from insurer's bad faith actions); see also
Schuessler, First Party Bad Faith: Should It Be Extended to Workers' CompensationCases?, 34
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q., Winter 1984, at 199, 217 (statutory penalties should be adequate to

cover most common cases of insurer delay or refusal to render benefits).
34. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Wis. 1979).
Prior to the Coleman decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that a bad faith cause
of action was available in first party insurance claims and, employing the same rationale, found
no reason why this bad faith action should not be extended to third party compensation claim-

ants. See id. at 221 (citing Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis.
1978)). The evidentiary standard of proof used by the Wisconsin courts in a traditional bad
faith action can be found in Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis.
1978).
35. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Wis. 1979).
36. See id. at 221.
37. See id. at 221.
38. See id. at 221. Plaintiff's petition specifically alleged:
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resulted in his being evicted from his home, causing him severe emotional
distress.39 In affirming the denial of the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that a worker may assert
a separate cause of action for damages occasioned by the alleged bad faith
settlement practices of a workers' compensation insurer.' The court found
that such action is "independent" of a claim for injuries covered by the Wisconsin Workers' Compensation Act.41 Rejecting the defendant's contention
that the Act provides the claimant's sole remedy, the court reasoned that the
available compensation remedy is exclusive, "only if the injury falls within
the coverage of the act."4 2 In this respect, the court found that the injury
complained of was "distinct in time and place" from the original industrial
injury, and, as such, it did not fall within the purview of the Act.4 3 Therefore, the exclusivity provision was no bar to a claim grounded on tort
principles."

These acts were intentional, malicious, and outrageous, and were meant to take advantage of John Coleman's present physical and mental condition. That these tactics of harassment and delay were meant to cause the plaintiff to give up on his claims, to minimize
the amount of the defendant's liability or to cause the (plaintiff] to starve. That such acts
are in bad faith and with the intent and effect of causing emotional distress.
Id. at 221.
39. See id. at 221. The plaintiff also stated that he had cooperated with the defendant at
all times by submitting the appropriate reports and permitting examinations by physicians.
See id. at 221.
40. See id. at 221.
41. See id. at 221.
42. See id. at 222 (emphasis added). But see 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 65.00, at 12-1 (1982) (injury not covered under compensation act; action for
compensable damages foreclosed, even if particular element of damages not compensated for).
43. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Wis. 1979).
44. See id.at 223; see also Reed v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 134,
135-36 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (applying Pennsylvania law, exclusivity of Act irrelevant to actions not
covered by it). In finding the injury to be separate and distinct from the original injury suffered in the course of employment and not merely an aggravation or extension of the original
injury, the Coleman court quoted Professor Larson to illustrate its finding:
It is true that but for the original injury the investigation would never have been undertaken and the second injury would not have occurred. But must we go on to say that the
carrier acquires complete tort immunity ever after for anything its agents do to carry out
their investigation? Suppose the agent had decided to burglarize the claimant's house to
get needed evidence. Suppose claimant died of fright on seeing the burglar. Is the compensation act the exclusive remedy, merely because the activity involved, which was the
collecting of evidence, was in the mainstream of the agent's duties?
Again, suppose a claimant has a compensable broken toe, and is being tailed by a photographer. Claimant sees him in the bushes, a scuffle ensues, and claimant receives a skull
fracture as a result of a blow from the camera. Is this skull fracture nothing but an
aggravation of the broken toe?
See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 223-24 (Wis. 1979) (quoting
2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 65.00, at 13-36 to -37 (1978)).
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Finding that the compensation act's penalty provision does not foreclose
an action for the tort of bad faith, the Coleman court emphatically maintained that the penalty provision was designed to avoid litigation by promoting the automatic payment of benefits where there is no justification for
delay.45 Therefore, in instances where the insurer's inexcusable delay was
due to its own mismanagement or deficient administration, the penalty provision was applicable." The court based its decision on the public policy
consideration of providing a remedy in instances where the penalty provision
may be wholly inadequate. 47 Where the insured has been harmed to the
extent that the remedies available in the provision are inadequate, the insured could bring an action for the tort of bad faith.48
In 1981, the Coleman decision was preempted by the Wisconsin Legislature and was replaced by a new penalty provision giving an exclusive remedy
for an insurer's bad faith conduct.4 9 The rationale of the Coleman decision
nevertheless remains viable in that it can serve as a guideline for extending
the tort of bad faith in workers' compensation claims in other jurisdictions.5"
Although the Coleman case has been the only decision to extend a bad faith
cause of action to workers' compensation claimants, other jurisdictions have
circumvented the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation statutes in
factual situations similar to that in Coleman. This is accomplished by allowing an independent action against an insurer for intentional infliction of
45. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Wis. 1979) (interpreting WIs. STAT. § 102-22(1) (1977), allowing for increase of compensation award of 10%
as penalty for inexcusable delay of payments).

46. See id, at 224.
47. See id. at 224. In regard to the inadequacy of the penalty provision, the court concluded: "The inexcusable-delay provision ... does not contemplate that the intentional tort
of bad faith can be expiated merely by payments augmented in the amount of 10 percent." See
id. at 224.

48. See id. at 224. The court relied on the holdings of other jurisdictions in reaching its
conclusion. See id. at 224 (citing Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir.
1974) (Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act does not prohibit

separate tort action for insurer's bad faith conduct outside bounds of Act); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974) (penalty provision of Alaska Workers'
Compensation Act no bar to recovery of intentional bad faith torts of insurer committed in

processing worker's claim)).
49. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(bp) (West Supp. 1984) (provides exclusive remedy for

employer's or insurer's bad faith conduct through imposition of lesser of 200% of compensation due or $15,000); see also Schuessler, First Party Bad Faith: Should It Be Extended to

Workers' Compensation Cases?, 34 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q., Winter 1984, at 199, 201-05 (comprehensive discussion and analysis of Coleman decision and its implications).
50. See Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 261-62 (Mont. 1980) (relying on
Coleman rationale in extending bad faith action to Montana compensation claimants); see also
Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982)
(James, J., dissenting) (asserting proposition that Coleman bad faith action be extended to

Texas compensation claimants), rev'd on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983).
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emotional distress.5 1
b.

The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Although the tort of bad faith has received limited recognition in the
workers' compensation area, several jurisdictions have allowed a claimant to
recover under an emotional distress theory. 2 The first case to pierce the
exclusiveness defense afforded an insurer under a workers' compensation
statute was Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange.53 In Unruh, the plaintiff
was a workers' compensation claimant who, over a period of time, was be54
friended by an investigator employed by plaintiff's compensation carrier.
During this period, the plaintiff became "emotionally involved" with the
agent, who used the relationship to obtain evidence refuting the plaintiff's
claim. 5 When the evidence was presented at the plaintiff's compensation
hearing and the deception was made known to her, the plaintiff suffered a
complete emotional breakdown requiring hospitalization. 6
The plaintiff was allowed to recover for the intentional torts5 7 committed

51. See Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1974) (intentional infliction of mental and emotional suffering under Maine law); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co.,
526 P.2d 37, 39, 42 (Alaska 1974) (conscious infliction of mental distress); Unruh v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825 (1972) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); see also Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387
A.2d 220, 222 (Me. 1978) (intentional infliction of physical and emotional distress); Hayes v.
Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 261, 262 (Mont. 1980) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Flamm v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 185 N.Y.S.2d 136, 138-39 (App. Div. 1959)
(action allowed for fraud and conspiracy against employer and physican independent of exclusivity provision).
52. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 68.34(b), (c) (1982 & Supp.
1983) (comprehensive list of cases discussing exclusive remedy provisions in relation to tort
actions brought for insurer's intentional refusal or delay of compensation payments resulting
in emotional distress).
53. See 498 P.2d 1063, 1066, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818 (1972).
54. See id.at 1066, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 818. The plaintiff in Unruh, as a result of her onthe-job injuries, underwent four major back surgeries, and at all times the defendant had
knowledge of the plaintiff's condition. See id. at 1066, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
55. See id. at 1066-67, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19. In Unruh, the carrier's agent had enticed
the plaintiff to accompany him on a trip to Disneyland. See id. at 1066, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
While at Disneyland, the agent inveigled her into crossing a rope and barrel bridge, and as she
crossed, the agent violently shook the bridge while another undercover investigator filmed the
event. See id. at 1066, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
56. See id. at 1066-67, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19. As a result of the injuries sustained, the
plaintiff sought $500,000 in general damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. See id. at
1067, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
57. See id. at 1076-77, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 828-29. The Unruh court allowed the plaintiff to
maintain an action for the intentional torts of assault and battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but found that the other counts grounded upon the theory of negligence
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by the insurer under the dual capacity doctrine.5" The court found that the
carrier had stepped out of its proper role of "insurer" by embarking upon a
detestable course of conduct and, therefore, as one acting under a different
capacity, should not be afforded protection under the workers' compensation
exclusivity provision.59 In subsequent California cases brought under the
Unruh rationale, the courts have been reluctant to allow tort claims outside

the exclusive remedy provisions, except where the insurer's conduct is
clearly of the outrageous and shocking nature found in Unruh.60
In other jurisdictions, however, cases subsequent to Unruh appeared to

relax the factual circumstances required for a separate tort action. In one
case, the claimant was injured attempting to turn off a shredder and subsequently brought an action against the machine's manufacturer for his inju-

ries.6 1 While the plaintiff's suit was pending, he brought an action for
conscious infliction of mental injury against the insurance carrier."

The ac-

tion was based on the allegation that the carrier willfully, maliciously, and
deliberately withheld his compensation benefits in an attempt to discourage
him from filing for his workers' compensation benefits. 63 The court held for

the claimant, stating that, in most instances, the compensation statute will
shield the insurer from liability in tort; however, "[i]n circumstances where
there is tortious conduct that goes beyond the bounds of untimely payments,
from suit provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act is
the immunity
'6 4
lost.

were protected by the exclusivity provision of the compensation act. See id. at 1076-77, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 828-29.
58. See id. at 1076-77, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 828-29. The dual-capacity doctrine was first
recognized by the California Supreme Court in 1952. See Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13-14
(Cal. 1952). The dual capacity doctrine allows an injured employee to bring a separate tort
action against his employer who has dual legal personalitites; one as an employer and another
in a secondary non-employer capacity. See id. at 15. This case involved a chiropractor who
was also the claimant's employer. See id. at 10. The doctor undertook to treat the claimant's
injury and negligently aggravated it in the process. See id. at 10. The court found that he was
acting in a doctor-patient capacity at the time and, therefore, was not immune from a tort
action for malpractice by virtue of his employer status. See id. at 13-14.
59. See Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1077, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 829 (1972).
60. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 189 Cal. Rptr. 761, 764 (Ct. App. 1983)
(Unruh exception for extreme and outrageous behavior falling outside reasonable behavior
expected of insurers); Ricard v. Pacific Indem. Co., 183 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506 (Ct. App. 1982)
(outrageous and deceitful conduct found in Unruh is required to state cause of action outside
exclusive remedy provision); Everfield v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 171 Cal. Rptr. 164,
165 (Ct. App. 1981) (insurer's conduct must be of outrageous nature); see also Schuessler, First
Party Bad Faith: Should It Be Extended To Worker's Compensation Cases?, 34 FED'N INS.
COUNS. Q., Winter 1984, at 199, 212 (discussing limited impact of Unruh decision).
61. See Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 38 (Alaska 1974).
62. See id. at 39.
63. See id. at 39.
64. See id. at 43. The Stafford court followed the reasoning in Unruh by finding that the
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In order to curb the subsequent wave of tort actions based on intentional
delays and terminations of payments,6 5 some courts began to demand that
the insurer's conduct be "conspicuously contemptible" for claimants to
bring tort actions. 66 For example, in an Illinois case, the insurer was held
liable for the tort of "outrage" where it intentionally withheld compensation
benefits until the statute of limitations had run on the claim and then proceeded to defend itself on that basis.6 7 Such case law, therefore, indicates
that an insurer's mere delay in making compensation payments will not be a
sufficient basis on which to ground an action in tort.6 8 The claimant must
instead prove the insurer's conduct went beyond the bounds of reasonableness, to the point of outrageousness, if the claimant expects to maintain a
cause of action for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
against a workers' compensation exclusivity defense. 69

insurer's immunity was lost when it exceeded its proper role under the compensation act by
committing an intentional tort. See id. at 43. The court also found that the exclusive remedy
provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act did not bar an intentional tort claim
arising from the wrongful conduct of the insurer since the Act did not provide a remedy for
such a wrong. See id. at 43. Furthermore, the court noted that the penalty provision of the
Act would be insufficient to redress the detriment suffered by the claimant. See id. at 43.
65. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 68.34(c), at 13-72 (1982 &
Supp. 1983) (Professor Larson asserts proposition that Stafford set off wave of bad faith tort
actions).
66. See Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 330 (1st Cir. 1974) (insurer stopped
payment on valid compensation payments only after claimant had deposited and made withdrawals against them, resulting in severe embarrassment and emotional distress); Coleman v.
American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Wis. 1979) (action for tort of bad faith
and intentional infliction of emotional distress after insurer stopped payments three times,
causing plaintiff to be evicted); see also 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
§ 68.34(c), at 13-75 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (in cases subsequent to Stafford, claimant typically
successful in factual situations wherein insurer's conduct "conspicuously contemptible").
67. See Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). The
egregiousness of the insurer's conduct is evidenced by the fact that the jury returned a
$2,000,000 punitive damages verdict in favor of the claimant. See id. at 304. Because Illinois
does not allow punitive damage recovery in such cases, the case was remanded on the issue of
damages. See id. at 310.
68. See Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1974) (mere late payment not sufficient basis for tort action); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43
(Alaska 1974) (tortious conduct must go beyond untimely payments to pierce exclusivity defense); Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1071-72, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1972)
(mere negligence of compensation carrier will not give rise to tort liability); Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Wis. 1979) (mere delays adequately compensated by 10% penalty award).
69. See Ricard v. Pacific Indem. Co., 183 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506 (Ct. App. 1982) (outrageous
and deceitful conduct needed to maintain tort action outside exclusive remedy provision);
Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (outrageous conduct
required to state action in tort).
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Statutory Penalties for Refusal or Delay in Compensation Benefits

When a workers' compensation claimant brings a tort action against an
insurer for wrongfully terminating or delaying compensation benefits, most
jurisdictions have held that such an action will not lie because the claimant's
recovery is limited to the exclusive remedies provided under the applicable
compensation statute.7 ° In an attempt to afford a claimant some type of
remedy for an insurer's inexcusable or unreasonable withholding of benefits,
virtually all states have enacted statutory penalty provisions to deal with this
problem. 71 The penalties are usually statutorily dictated percentages that
are added to the amount of unpaid compensation 72 and range from 10% 7 1 to
200%. 7 4 In some states, attorney's fees may also be awarded.7 5
Although the jurisdictions vary greatly in the requisites of proof required
to recover under the respective penalty provisions,76 in most jurisdictions the
penalties are fixed at a specific percentage irrespective of the insurer's con-

70. See, e.g., Hixon v. State Compensation Fund, 565 P.2d 898, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(action brought for intentional infliction of emotional distress occasioned by improper termination of compensation benefits barred by workers' compensation exclusivity provision); Young
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 588 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (bad faith action
for insurer's refusal to pay benefits foreclosed by exclusive remedies provided under workers'
compensation statute); Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 650 P.2d 1, 2 (N.M.
1982) (compensation act provides exclusive remedy; bars claimant's action for emotional distress and mental anguish resulting from insurer's failure to pay compensation).
71. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114-705(e) (1983) (providing 15% penalty for insurer's
inexcusable delay of compensation benefits); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 104-A(2) (Supp.
1984) (forfeiture of $25 per day for insurer's failure to pay compensation); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (providing for 15% penalty of all past
due compensation).
72. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (West 1978) (12% of difference between
amount tendered or paid and amount found due); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (SmithHurd Supp. 1985) (percentage award of compensation "additional to that otherwise payable");
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (percentage of "total compensation
due"). But see CAL. LAB. CODE § 5814 (Deering 1976) (10% penalty added to "full amount"
of claimant's award); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(l)(b) (West Supp. 1985) (additional award
of 25% added to "final" compensation award for an insurer's unreasonable or vexatious
delay).
73. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 5814 (Deering 1976) (10% penalty for delay); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 440.20(7) (West Supp. 1984) (punitive penalty of 10% of unpaid installment).
74. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (up to 200% or $15,000
penalty may be assessed against insurer for malicious or bad faith failure to pay compensation
benefits).
75. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.16 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (reasonable attorney's fees recoverable where insurer's delay unreasonable); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658
(West 1978) (punitive penalty of 12% and "all reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution
and collection of such amount").
76. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1)(b) (West Supp. 1985) (providing up to
25% additional compensation where insurer "unreasonably or vexatiously delayed payments")
with WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (200% or $15,000 penalty assessed
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duct.77 Some states, however, have adopted penalty provisions which take
into account instances where an insurer acts intentionally or unreasonably in
denying benefits by increasing the percentage awarded to the claimant. 78 In
Illinois, for example, where an insurer is merely "negligent" in failing to pay
a claim, the claimant may be entitled to an additional ten dollars per day for
every day the benefits remain unpaid. 79 The Illinois statute increases the
penalty to 50% of the benefits due where the insurer has unreasonably or
vexatiously delayed payments, intentionally underpaid compensation, or instituted frivolous proceedings for the purpose of delay where no real controversy ever existed as to the insurer's liability for paying the compensation. 80
A penalty statute similar to Illinois' is also in effect in Wisconsin.8 1 Under
the Wisconsin penalty provision, a claimant may have his unpaid compensation benefits increased by 25% where the insurer has not acted in "good
faith" in processing a claim.8 2 The statute also provides for those instances
when a carrier acts with "malice or bad faith" by awarding a claimant "the
lesser of 200% of total compensation due or $15,000. ' ' 3 The Wisconsin

statute specifically designates these provisions as the claimant's "exclusive
where carrier suspends, terminates, or fails to make payments resulting from "malice or bad
faith").
77. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5814 (Deering 1976) (penalty fixed at 10% of compensation award); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-705(e) (1983) (penalty designated at set rate of 15% after
14 days); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (penalty not to
exceed 15% of unpaid compensation).
78. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (penalty imposed
against insurer whose actions are "unreasonable," "vexatious," or "intentional"); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22.658 (West 1978) (percentage penalty plus attorney's fees where insurer's
conduct "arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause"); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.225(l)(b) (West Supp. 1985) (penalty assessed against insurer who acts "unreasonably or
vexatiously"); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (penalty imposed where
insurer's conduct malicious or in bad faith).
79. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (penalty imposed
where carrier shall "without good and just cause fail, neglect, refuse, or unreasonably delay"
payments). Although the penalty will be assessed at $10 per day, it shall not exceed a total of
$2500. See id.
80. See id. § 138.19(k).
81. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(b)-(bp) (West Supp. 1985). Compare ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (compensation claimant entitled to recovery for insurer's unreasonable or vexatious delay) with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West
Supp. 1985) (insured allowed recovery for insurer's malicious or bad faith settlement
practices).
82. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(b) (West Supp. 1985).
83. See id. 102.18(l)(bp). Under the statute, the Department of Labor defines what conduct demonstrates malice or bad faith in assessing a penalty. See id. § 102.18(1)(br). Under
Wisconsin common law, however, in order to show an insurer's "bad faith" the plaintiff must
show "[tihe absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's
knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim." See
Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978).
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remedy," which legislatively preempts Coleman and forecloses
a claimant's
84
common-law action for the intentional tort of bad faith.
Thus, in looking at the Illinois and Wisconsin penalty statutes, it appears
that the needs of both the insurer and the claimant are adequately addressed.85 First, the statutes hold the insurer accountable for his actions by
imposing fair and adequate penalties where the circumstances dictate. 86 Secondly, the penalty statutes provide the claimant with an adequate remedy for
any detriment he may have suffered and create an incentive for the insurer to
act reasonably in settling an employee's claim. 87 Finally, by barring common-law recoveries, the statutes foreclose the possibility of high damage verdicts being assessed against the carrier, possibly
resulting in the
8
disintegration of the workers' compensation scheme.
In determining whether the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act 89 precludes a common-law tort action for an
insurer's bad faith settlement practices, it is important to consider the current state of Texas law concerning an insurer's duty of good faith and fair
dealing in insurance contracts. 90
84. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (statute provides claimant's

exclusive remedy for insurer's bad faith conduct).
85. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (statute serves
employee's needs by awarding additional compensation in form of 50% for insurer's bad faith
actions, while limiting insurer's liability by providing claimant's exclusive remedy under Act);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (claimant allowed up to 200% additional

compensation for insurer's bad faith conduct; insurer's liability limited to $15,000).
86. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (50% penalty
award for unreasonable or vexatious delay, $10 per day for negligent delay); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.18(l)(b)-(bp) (West. Supp. 1985) (200% penalty award for malicious or bad faith conduct, 25% penalty in other instances of delay).
87. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (redresses claimant
by imposition of 50% penalty for insurer's unreasonable or vexatious settlement practices);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West. Supp. 1985) (providing claimant additional 200%
increase in compensation award for detriment suffered from insurer's bad faith actions).
88. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (claimant's exclusive remedy against insurer provided by statute); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West
Supp. 1985) (provision furnishes claimant's "exclusive remedy"); see also Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981) (threat of unlimited tort damages evidenced by jury verdict against workers' compensation carrier for $150,000 general damages
and $2,000,000 punitive damages).
89. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3a (Vernon 1967).
90. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 599-600 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982) (James, J., dissenting) (discussion of evolution of insurer's implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing recognized in insurance contracts as applicable to workers' compensation
insurance contracts), rev'd on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983).
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VIABILITY OF EXTENDING A BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION TO
TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS

Recognition of Insurer's Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealingin
Texas

It is well established in Texas that "[aiccompanying every contract is a
common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience and
faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe
any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of contract." 9 1 The same
duty of care and faithfulness which arises in common-law contractual rela92
tionships has also been found to be applicable to insurance contracts;
Texas law acknowledges that an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
exists in insurance contracts.9 3 Therefore, since an intentional breach of this
duty may be actionable in tort, 94 it is necessary to examine if the exclusive
remedy provision of the compensation statute bars a separate tort action for
the intentional wrongdoing of a compensation carrier in connection with the
processing of an employee's claim.
91. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510
(1947) (emphasis added). The Scharrenbeck case involved a service contract to repair and
maintain plaintiff's gas heater. See id. at 155, 204 S.W.2d at 509. Defendant's negligent repair
caused plaintiff's house to burn, resulting in the court's finding that the defendant breached an
implied duty to use care. See id. at 157, 204 S.W.2d at 510. In finding the defendant liable in
tort and independent of an action for breach of contract, the court stated: "[i]n such a case,
the contract is mere inducement creating the state of things which furnishes the occasion of the
tort." See id. at 157, 204 S.W.2d at 510; see also Diamond v. Duncan, 107 Tex. 256, 260, 172
S.W. 1100, 1100 (1915) (duty to use care grows out of contractual relationship).
92. See Burroughs v. Bunch, 210 S.W.2d 211, 214-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948,
writ refd) (failure of insurance broker to obtain policy constitutes breach of implied duty to
use care in insurance contract); see also American Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Redford, 337
S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (general rules of contract law
also applicable to insurance contracts). A breach of an implied contractual duty of good faith
and fair dealing may also sound in tort. See Jack Criswell Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Tsichlis,
549 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ) (defendant car dealer liable in
tort for intentionally deceiving immigrant car buyer and not procuring insurance as provided
under sales contract). Where the breach of the implied duty of good faith is intentional, one
may also recover punitive damages. See City Prods. Corp. v. Berman, 610 S.W.2d 446, 450
(Tex. 1980) ("When a distinct, willful tort is alleged and proved in connection with a suit upon
a contract, one may recover punitive damages, but even in that instance the complainant must
prove that he suffered some actual damages.").
93. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508,
510 (1947) (Texas common law recognizes implied duty of good faith and fair dealing accompanies every contract); see also American Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Redford, 337 S.W.2d 230,
231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (general rules of contract law equally
applicable to insurance contracts).
94. See Jack Criswell Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Tsichlis, 549 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ) (breach of implied contractual duty of good faith and fair
dealing may sound in tort).
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The Downfall of the Texas Exclusive Remedy Provision and the
PotentialRecognition of a Common-Law Bad Faith ActionMassey v. Armco Steel Co.

Prior case law interpreting the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act has held that the Act does not exempt employers or their compensation carriers from common-law liability for intentional
torts committed against an employee. 95 Where an employee elects to file a
claim under the Act for benefits, however, he is precluded from maintaining
a common-law action for an intentional tort.96 Although the decisions interpreting the exclusive remedy provision clearly prohibit a separate action for
an intentional tort causing the original industrial injury,97 the Act may no
longer bar a separate action for an intentional tort predicated on an act occurring after the original injury and during the settlement process. 98 The
Texas Supreme Court has recently declared that an employee may not be
relegated solely to a workers' compensation claim, but "may have one claim
against his employer under the Workers' Compensation Act and a claim at

95. See Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. 1980) (employee's cause of
action for intentional torts of employers and carriers guaranteed by Texas Constitution and
may not be eliminated by legislature); see also Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Shubert, 646 S.W.2d
270, 278 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ refd n.r.e.) (Act does not exempt carrier or employer
from common-law liabilities based on intentional injuries or torts).
96. See Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1974) (compensation
act provides employee with substitute cause of action for injuries occasioned at hands of carrier
or employer); Grove Mfg. Co. v. Cardinal Const. Co., 534 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (employee waives action for intentional torts by
seeking benefits under act); Jones v. Jeffrey, 244 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1951, writ refd) (election to proceed under Act waives common-law remedies).
97. See Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. 1980) (Act does not destroy
claimant's right to sue for intentional injuries occasioned by employer); Paradissis v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 507 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1974) (employer and insurer exempt from liability
for intentional injuries arising out of "course of employment"). Article 8306, § 20 of the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act states:
The terms "Injury" or "Personal Injury" shall also be construed to mean and include
"Occupational Diseases," ...

the term "Occupational Disease" ...

shall be construed

to mean any disease arising out of and in the course of employment which causes damage
or harm to the physical structure of the body and other such diseases or infections as
naturally result therefrom.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1985). Thus, it is doubtful,
from examining the statutory language, that an insurer's bad faith conduct could be construed
as an "occupational disease" which arises in the "course of employment," and thereby bar an
intentional tort claim based on such conduct. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596,
604 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982) (James, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds,
652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983).
98. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983) (impliedly holding
claimant may maintain action for insurer's intentional torts where tort claim mutually exclusive of compensation claim).
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common law for an intentional tort" arising in the settlement process. 99
In Massey v. Armco-Steel Co., o the Industrial Accident Board (IAB)
awarded the plaintiff total and permanent compensation for injuries received
in the course of his employment.101 The insurer appealed the IAB's award
to the district court.102 In his counterclaim, apart from his claim for recovery of benefits due under the policy, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants
had conspired against him to hinder settlement of his compensation
claim."10 He also alleged that the defendants breached their duty of good
faith and fair dealing owed under an insurance contract and sought recovery
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.'" On appeal, the Texas
Supreme Court reasoned that an employee would have a cause of action for
an intentional tort if the alleged tort was mutually exclusive of his right to
recover compensation benefits under the Act.' 0 5 Finding that the plaintiff
did not allege sufficient facts to sustain a cause of action for civil conspiracy,
the court remanded the case, allowing the plaintiff to amend his pleadings
and to state some other intentional act(s) separate from the compensation

99. See id. at 933.
100. See id at 932.
101. See id.at 933. In Massey, the plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury ultimately resulting in amputation of a finger. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983). In
conjunction with the hand injury, the plaintiff alleged associated injuries to his arm, shoulder,
and neck, resulting in "emotional trauma in the form of near-psychotic reactive depression."
See id.at 597. The plaintiff also contended throughout the proceedings that the medical evidence was uncontradicted. See id. at 597.
102. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983). Under the Workers' Compensation Act, all questions arising under the Act not settled by agreement between
the interested parties shall be determined by the IAB. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The IAB conducts a hearing and renders a decision as to
what, if any, compensation should be paid. See id.If either party to a claim does not wish to
abide by the ruling of the IAB, they may appeal the award to the district court for a trial on
the "rights and liability of the parties thereto." See id.
103. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983). The plaintiff
brought an action in tort rather than for breach of the compensation insurance contract. See
Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983). Furthermore, it was alleged that the
defendants were aware of the plaintiff's uncontradicted medical evidence in regard to his poor
physical and mental condition and made a "conscious decision that he was not capable of
withstanding extended settlement negotiations or a lengthy litigation period." See id.at 597.
Thus, the plaintiff contended that his injuries were not limited to the loss of his finger and that
he should be entitled to recover in tort for the bad faith actions of the defendants in processing
his claim. See id.at 597.
104. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983).
105. See id.at 933. For a general discussion of the Massey decision in relation to the
Texas workers' compensation exclusivity provision, see generally Brousseau, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 345, 355-58 (1984).
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claim. 106 Consequently, despite the fact that the court employed the ambiguous term "mutually exclusive," its remand of the case, coupled with its use
of the expressions "separable" and "independent" 10 7 terms, which other
courts have specifically relied upon in recognizing an independent cause of
action for a carrier's bad faith settlement practices, lends support to the conclusion that the Texas Supreme Court intended to do the same.'°8 A comparison of the Massey decision with decisions from other jurisdictions may
clarify the ambiguity in the terms used by the Massey court.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, although not using the "mutually exclusive" language in Coleman, employed similar language to that used in Massey.1 9 Since the action in Coleman was found to be based on a "separate
injury" not covered by the Act,"1 0 it may be concluded that the plaintiff's
action in Coleman was "mutually exclusive" of his compensation claim, as

106. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983). The court found
that the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants "agreed to resist his claim," rejected his
proposed settlements, and ultimately appealed the award of the IAB, were not sufficient to
state a cause of action for civil conspiracy. See id. at 934. The essential elements of a civil
conspiracy action are: "(1) two or more persons ... ; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a
meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and
(5) damages as the proximate result thereof." See id. at 934 (citing 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy
§ 1(2) (1967)). In rejecting the plaintiff's cause of action, the court found that the alleged overt
acts of the defendants in refusing to settle and appealing the IAB's award were not unlawful
per se. See id. at 934.
107. See id. at 933 (because compensation claim and tort claim are "mutually exclusive,
employer's intentional act must be separable from compensation claim and must produce independent injury"); see also Brousseau, Workers' Compensation,Annual Survey of Texas Law,
38 Sw. L.J. 345, 355 (1984) (noting that Massey decision not "definitive opinion in the difficult
area of exclusivity of remedy" and leaves "several questions subject to continuing doubt").
108. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Wis. 1979)
(claimant's action not based on original industrial injury, but on "separate" injury resulting
from "intentional" acts of insurer while investigating claim); see also Hayes v. Aetna Fire
Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 262 (Mont. 1980) (employing language similar to Massey and
Coleman in upholding workers' compensation claimants bad faith cause of action).
109. Compare Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Wis.
1979) (insurer's intentional bad faith acts must produce "separate" injury from original industrial injury) with Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983) (intentional act
of insurer must be "separable" from compensation claim and must produce independent
injury).
110. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Wis. 1979).
The Coleman court also stated that the claimant's injury was occasioned by the bad faith acts
of the insurer and, thus, was not barred by the exclusive remedy provision because the injury
was "distinct in time and place" from the original job-related injury subject to the compensation laws. See id. at 223. In reaching its conclusion, the Coleman court followed the lead of
other jurisdictions also finding that a claimant's action for intentional torts of an insurer is
separate from the compensation claim. See id. at 223 (citing Reed v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 134, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1973)); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526
P.2d 37, 42 (Alaska 1974).
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that term would be generally understood. Similarly, three courts in other
jurisdictions, while not using language as specific as that used in Massey and
Coleman, have ostensibly reached the same results.1 1 ' In finding that the
exclusive remedy provisions did not bar a claimant's action for the intentional torts of an insurer, one court stated that the plaintiff's cause of action
was based on the insurer's "alleged independent intentional torts and breach
of their agreement, unrelated to [the plaintiff's] employment."' 12 A second
court found that the insurer's bad faith conduct gave rise to an "independent
action" separate from the original job-related injury." 3 A third court noted
that the "compensation law is exclusive only where in fact it provides a remedy."1 14 From the context of the above courts' use of such language as "unrelated," "independent action," and "exclusive only where in fact it provides
a remedy," it may be inferred that they intended to grant a separate tort
action where it is "mutually exclusive" of the claim for compensation." 5
Though a comparison of Massey's "mutually exclusive" language with similar language of other jurisdictions may help indicate what the Texas
Supreme Court intended, the ultimate interpretation of the term "mutually
16
exclusive" remains a task for future courts faced with this issue."
The Massey court never reached the plaintiff's last claim that the insurer
17
breached its implied duty of good faith under the insurance contract.

111. See Reed v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 134, 135-36 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974); Hayes v. Aetna
Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 262 (Mont. 1980).
112. See Reed v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 134, 135 (E.D. Pa.

1973). The court further stated the tortious acts of the insurer resulted in a "completely independent cause of action, arising out of the relationship between insured and insurer" and not
from the original industrial injury on which the compensation claim was based. See id. at 135.
113. See Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 262 (Mont. 1980). Significantly, the Hayes court, in structuring the language and reasoning behind its decision, relied
very heavily upon the rationale of the Coleman decision. See id. at 262-63.
114. See Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974). In finding
the "compensation law exclusive only where" it provides a remedy, the Alaska Supreme Court
premised is decision on the rationale that intentional wrongs committed in conjunction with
the payment and investigation of claims should be protected by the exclusivity provision. See

id. at 44.
115. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982) (James, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1983). Following the rationale of Coleman and Stafford, Justice James, advocating the imposition of a
bad faith tort action for an insurer's breach of good faith and fair dealing, noted that the tort
action was "separate and distinct" from an action arising under an insurance contract. See id.
at 599.
116. See Brousseau, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J.

345, 355 (1984) (Massey language not definitive; leaves exclusive remedy issue open for
interpretation).
117. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933-34 (Tex. 1983) (addressed
issue of good faith and fair dealing, but failed to resolve before reversing and remanding case).
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Therefore, the question also remains unresolved as to whether a Texas workers' compensation claimant may maintain a separate tort action for a compensation carrier's breach of good faith and fair dealing owed under an
insurance contract. It is significant that by remanding the case to give the
plaintiff an opportunity to amend, the court may have impliedly recognized
a separate bad
faith action where there is a sufficient factual basis to support
18
the claim.'
V.

A PROPOSED EXTENSION OF A BAD FAITH CAUSE OF ACTION IN
TEXAS

A.

Proposed Standard of Review for the Tort of Bad Faith in Texas

As previously discussed, Texas does not recognize a common-law action
for the bad faith settlement practices of workers' compensation insurance
carriers.1 9 Therefore, in advocating the adoption of a bad faith cause of
action, it is necessary to examine the standards of review employed by other
jurisdictions in evaluating a bad faith claim. Although each jurisdiction has
its own criteria as to what must be asserted to state a cause of action for the
tort of bad faith, four common elements transcend these geopolitical differences. 1 20 For a workers' compensation claimant to recover under a bad faith
theory, he first has to establish the carrier's duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in the insurance contract.1 2 1 Second, he must prove the carrier
breached that duty by showing the lack of a reasonable basis for denying

118. See id. at 934. The court stated that the plaintiff should be entitled to amend his
pleadings to state a sufficient cause of action, and that the trial court erred in handling the
matter by summary judgment. See id. at 934 (construing Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974) (party must be given opportunity to amend for failure to
state cause of action before issue may be resolved through summary judgment)).
119. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983) (impliedly recognizing bad faith action by declaring that employee may have cause of action for intentional tort
and separate action for compensation where these actions are "mutually exclusive"). But see
Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1974) (employee barred from
bringing action for intentional tort where he seeks recovery under Workers' Compensation
Act).
120. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982) (James, J., dissenting) (advocating adoption of bad faith tort in Texas using common elements gleaned from other jurisdictions), rev'd on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.
1983); see also Comment, Tort of Insurer'sBad Faith Refusal to Pay First Party Claims, 82 W.
VA. L. REV. 579, 596 (1980) (listing common elements of prima facie case of bad faith).
121. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486
(1973) (first case recognizing duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in insurance contract;
breach of such duty gives rise to bad faith tort action); see also Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947) (first Texas case to recognize
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contract).
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benefits and the carrier's knowledge or reckless disregard of the absence of a
reasonable basis.' 2 2 Third, the claimant must demonstrate that the carrier's
bad faith conduct proximately caused the injury complained of and was
"separate" and "independent" from the original job-related injury. 1 23
Fourth, the claimant must establish that he sustained substantial damages as
1 24
a result of the carrier's actions.
In adopting the above standard of review for the tort of bad faith, it is
imperative that the alleged facts giving rise to the claim be judged on an
objective basis, that is, would the "reasonable insurer" under similar circumstances have delayed or denied the claimant's benefits.12 5 By employing an
objective basis of review, an insurer may freely deny questionable or extortionate claims.' 2 6 If an insurer exercises ordinary care or has a "reasonable
basis" in denying a claim it has nothing to fear but a judge or jury's interpretive analysis.' 27 Consequently, recognition of the tort of bad faith in Texas
would tend to equalize the bargaining power between the parties, in that the
carrier would no longer be permitted to hide behind the protection afforded

122. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978) (establishing applicable standard of care for tort of bad faith in insurance context). See generally
Schuessler, First Party Bad Faith: Should It Be Extended to Workers' Compensation Cases, 34
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q., Winter 1984, at 199, 207 (acknowledging Anderson as setting applicable standard of care for tort of bad faith); Comment, An Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay a
Valid First Party Claim: A Tort Whose Time Has Come in Iowa, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 987, 991
(1983) (recognizing Anderson as establishing applicable standard of care in first party bad faith
action); Comment, Tort of Insurer'sBad Faith Refusal to Pay First-PartyClaims, 82 W. VA. L.
REV. 579, 596 (1980) (listing Anderson standard as common element of tort of bad faith).
123. See Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 262 (Mont. 1980) (injury suffered as result of insurer's bad faith must be "independent" from original industrial injury);
Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Wis. 1979) (original jobrelated injury must be "separate" from injury upon which bad faith action based).
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965) (measure of tort damages
based on purpose for which action maintained); accord TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306,
§ 18a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (15% penalty for delayed compensation sufficient to redress
claimant absent substantial harm).
125. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Wis. 1978) (advocating
use of objective "reasonable man" standard in adjudicating bad faith cases); see also Massey v.
Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982) (James, J.,
dissenting) (advocating objective standard of knowledge for adoption of bad faith tort in
Texas), rev'd on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983); Parks & Heil, The Tort of "Bad
Faith"-The Impact of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 24 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q.,
Spring 1974, at 3, 12-13 (bad faith tort should be judged by objective "reasonable man" standard rather than subjective standard of what insurer thought was reasonable due in part to
potential harm that may arise from subjective standard).
126. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Wis. 1978) (insurer
need not fear being found liable for bad faith tort where it acts reasonably and in good faith in
denying debatable claims).
127. See id. at 377.
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128
by the exclusivity provision.

B.

The Need for a Statutory Bad Faith Remedy-A Legislative Proposal

Since the Texas courts have not yet provided an adequate common-law
remedy for injuries occasioned from an insurer's bad faith settlement prac-

tices, 129 the responsibility of correcting this inequity lies with the Texas Leg-

islature.13 Judicial intervention would indeed cure many of the inequities
which result under the existing law; however, legislative action would likely
31

provide clearer guidelines and help abolish the present inequities.'
Through the promulgation of statutory penalites and guidelines, the legisla-

ture can fashion a "bad faith" remedy which will compensate an employee
for the detriment he may have suffered and protect the insurer by limiting
the amount which may be recovered. 1 32 Currently, the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act provides for a 15% penalty for delays in the payment of
compensation. 1 33 This current provision, however, does not contemplate
that injuries resulting from the intentional bad faith acts of an insurer can be
134
expiated by the mere addition of 15% to the past-due compensation.

128. See Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 256, 262 (Mont. 1980) (carrier
forced to deal with insured in good faith by recognizing bad faith tort).
129. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983). In Massey, the
court impliedly adopted a common-law remedy where a claimant can state sufficient facts to
sustain an action for intentional torts against an insurer; however, the tort action must be
mutually exclusive of the claim for compensation and produce an independent injury. See id.
at 934.
130. See Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1974) (absent legislative mandate, court must construe statute as written since compensation act intended to be
employees' exclusive system of redress); Woolsey v. Panhandle Ref. Co., 131 Tex. 449, 456,
116 S.W.2d 675, 678 (1938) (regrettable claimant left without adequate remedy, but "it is the
duty of courts to construe laws as enacted, and to carry out the intention of the Legislature as
expressed in such laws").
131. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (provides remedy
for insurer's intentional wrongs and establishes discernible guidelines for insurer to follow in
processing and settling claims); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(l)(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1985)
(statute establishes guidelines for insurer to follow in handling employee claims); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (balances equities by granting claimant adequate redress for malicious or bad faith conduct of insurer and limiting insurer's potential liability with
exclusive remedy provision).
132. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 120.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (providing claimant remedy for detriment resulting from wrongful acts of insurer; puts ceiling on amount recoverable
to protect insurer).
133. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (15%
penalty award on amount of past due compensation attributable to insurer's delay in
payments).
134. See Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 42 (Alaska 1974) (nominal
penalty award to claimant for insurer's malicious or intentional bad faith acts insufficient to
redress claimant for potential harm resulting therefrom); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters,
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The legislative proposal, which appears below, is modeled after statutes
which have recently been enacted in Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. 3 5
These statutes have been enacted to address instances where an insurer acts
36
unreasonably or in bad faith in processing or settling an employee's claim. 1
The proposal, which includes statutorily regulated penalties for an insurer's
bad faith conduct, is aimed at balancing the bargaining powers between the
parties by creating an incentive for the insurer to deal fairly and in good
faith when processing a claim. The proposed amendment to the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act is as follows:
Additional Award as Penaltyfor Bad Faith Conduct of Insurance Carriers or Employers in the Processingor Settlement of Employee Claims
(a) After notice and a hearing or upon the opportunity to be
heard,' 3 7 the Industrial Accident Board, or upon appeal, a court of
competent jurisdiction, may in its discretion award additional compensation which it considers just,138 up to, but not exceeding, the lesser of
200% of the compensation then past due or $70,0001 in any case
where an insurance carrier or employer has:
(1) instituted proceedings and/or interposed a defense where no real
609 P.2d 257, 262 (Mont. 1980) (10% penalty award does not adequately compensate employee for detriment resulting from insurer's bad faith conduct; employee entitled to another
remedy); Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Wis. 1978) (penalty
provision providing for imposition of 10% additional award for delayed payments does not
contemplate insurer's intentionally calculated harm).
135. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 176.225(1) (West Supp. 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985).
136. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (addresses insurer's unreasonable, vexatious, intentional, and frivolous conduct); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.225(l)(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1985) (statute contemplates insurer's negligent, intentional,
unreasonable, and vexatious conduct); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985)
(imposes 200% or $15,000 penalty for insurer's malicious and bad faith conduct in handling
claims).
137. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1) (West Supp. 1985) (providing party against
whom proceeding brought opportunity to be heard so as to refute charges against him and
provide due process under law).
138. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(a) (West Supp. 1985) (intended to give party in
best position to hear facts and circumstances of case discretion in awarding just amount of
penalty); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1) (West Supp. 1985) (tribunal given discretion
in awarding additional amount).
139. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (department may award
just compensation "not to exceed the lesser of 200% of total compensation due or $15,000").
This proposal is reasonably modest in light of the amount of damages recoverable under a
similar provision of the Texas Insurance Code. See TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21,
§ 16(b)(l) (Vernon 1981) (where insurer acts unfairly or deceptively, insured may recover
"three times the amount of actual damages plus court costs and attorney's fees").
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or present controversy exists as to the carrier's liability to pay the compensation, but which are only frivolous or are for delay;" or
(2) unreasonably, vexatiously, or in bad faith delayed or refused
compensation payments;141 or
(3) intentionally underpaid compensation. 142
(b) The penalty award as provided in this section is to be the employee's exclusive remedy against an insurance carrier or employer for
engaging in conduct described in subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3). 143
(c) Actions or conduct rising to the level described in subsections
(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) are to be defined by rule of the Industrial Accident Board. 144
The employment of this penalty provision is intended to be discretionary
with the IAB or the courts. 14 5 The imposition of a penalty under this proposed statute should be tailored to the individual facts and circumstances

surrounding each case, and its sanctions should be imposed only where warranted. 146 Perhaps one pitfall of the proposed legislation is that it may result

140. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (penalty available
where "proceedings have been instituted or carried by one liable to pay the compensation,
which do not present a real controversy, but are merely frivolous or for delay"); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 176.225(l)(a) (West Supp. 1985) ("instituted a proceeding or interposed a defense
which does not present a real controversy but which is frivolous or for the purpose of delay").
141. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (penalty imposed
where insurer's conduct unreasonable or vexatious in delaying payments); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.189(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (statute sets applicable standard of recovery for bad faith
action). Because the statutes have only recently been enacted, there is a scarcity of case law
construing them; therefore, the Anderson common-law test for bad faith could be employed
here. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978) (establishing
applicable standard of proof for tort of bad faith: "the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the [insurer's] knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a
reasonable basis for denying the claim").
142. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1)(d) (West Supp. 1984) (penalty may be imposed
where employer or insurer has "intentionally underpaid compensation").
143. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1984) (provision designed to be
claimants' exclusive remedy, thereby foreclosing claimant from bringing tort action for wrongs
covered by provision).
144. See id. ("department may, by rule, define actions which demonstrate malice or bad
faith"). This provision is intended to give the tribunal control over what levels of conduct
exceed those described in the provision, as they are in the best position to define such levels of
conduct. See id.
145. See id. § 102.18(l)(b) (imposition of penalty left to discretion of department of labor); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1) (West Supp. 1985) (assessment of penalty award
discretionary with compensation judge or court).
146. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1) (West Supp. 1985) (upon notice and hearing,
compensation judge or court may impose sanctions if warranted); Wis. STAT. ANN.
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in a barrage of bad faith claims.14 7 Once the standards are established as to
what constitutes "bad faith," however, the proposed statute should reduce
the actions brought to those which are of a truly meritorious nature.
Besides providing a claimant with a bad faith remedy, the proposed statute has other benefits. The exclusive remedy proviso of the legislative enactment has the distinct advantage of guaranteeing greater protection for the
employee and, at the same time, the proposal adequately insulates the insurer from liability in tort and its resultant high damages.14 The insulation
of the insurer from excessive liability in tort will also ultimately protect the
consumer by indirectly maintaining the price of goods.14 9 In a workers'
compensation situation, the employer pays the premium to the insurer with
the employee being named as a third-party beneficiary.' 5 ° When the insurer
is burdened with a tort verdict, the penalty passed on to the employer in the
form of increased premiums are thereafter transferred to the consumer
through an increase in the cost of the employer's goods and services.'' This
"passing the buck" situation would be almost nonexistent under the proposed legislation due to the reduced likelihood of insurer tort liability.' 5 2
Therefore, the enactment of the proposed statute by the Texas Legislature
would act to adequately serve and protect the interests of all concerned
parties.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, courts have precluded a compensation claimant from bringing a bad faith action against an insurer, reasoning that the injured claim§ 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (based upon ultimate facts of case, department of labor may
assess penalty where insurer acts in bad faith).
147. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 68.34(c), at 13-72 (1982)
(noting that Stafford decision set off wave of tort claims against insurers).
148. Cf Sparks v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Ariz. 1982) (en
banc) (upheld $4.5 million damage verdict against insurer for terminating claimant's policy in
bad faith); see also Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
($2 million punitive damage award against workers' compensation insurance carrier who intentionally acted in bad faith in processing employee claim).
149. See Allen, InsuranceBad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC.
L.J. 833, 857 (1982) (consumer protected as result of legislative limits imposed on amount
insured may recover in bad faith action).
150. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12g (Vernon 1967) (provision providing for payment of premiums for compensation insurance by employers in all instances with
employee as beneficiary).
151. See Allen, InsuranceBad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC.
L.J. 833, 857 (1982) (society as consumer ultimately bears risk of loss in form of higher premium and cost of goods sold occasioned by virtually unlimited tort verdicts rendered against
insurers).
152. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(l)(bp) (West Supp. 1985) (foreclosing tort action and
resulting tort liability by providing claimant's exclusive remedy under compensation act).
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ant's "exclusive remedy" for the intentional torts of his employer and
compensation carrier are provided under the applicable workers' compensation statute. This line of reasoning, however, has faltered in recent years as
courts have begun to uphold a claimant's right to bring a bad faith action
against an insurer for torts committed in processing a worker's claim. This
right of action has been upheld on two principal grounds. First, the claimant's action is not based on the original industrial injury, but on a "second
and separate injury" resulting from the bad faith acts of the insurer in
processing the claim."5 3 Therefore, since the compensation act does not
cover the injury, the exclusivity provision cannot bar an action to recover for
it. The second method of recovery is based on public policy considerations,
in that the nominal penalty awards available to the claimant are not adequate to redress the injury inflicted, and the claimant should be entitled to
another remedy.
Although the Texas courts have not as yet expressly granted a compensation claimant a bad faith cause of action against an insurer, they may have
impliedly done so in the Massey case. The Massey decision granted a claimant the right to have one claim for compensation and another for the intentional torts of an insurer if such claims are "mutually exclusive." 1 54 Exactly
what the "mutually exclusive" language means is left for future courts to
decide. It may be reasonably inferred, however, that the court intended to
grant a compensation claimant a bad faith action where sufficient facts are
plead to sustain the action.
Alternatively, in the absence of, or in addition to, judicial intervention, it
can be strongly argued that the most appropriate solution to the present
workers' compensation problem is legislative action. With the enactment of
this author's proposed statute, the Texas Legislature could afford protection
to the insured and insurer alike and at the same time eradicate the harsh and
often unfair result of the present system. As the law in Texas now stands, it
actually encourages a compensation insurer to act unreasonably in processing the claims of a worker, as the insurer is able to shield itself from liability
by hiding behind the protection afforded by the exclusive remedy provision.

153. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Wis. 1979).
154. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983).
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